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Federal Reserve Board Control Over Bank Holding Companies: Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp.' —Respondent.
First. Lincolnwood Corporation was incorporated under Illinois law for the
purpose of becoming a bank holding company 2 by acquiring the First Na-
tional Bank of Lincolnwood (Bank). 3 Section 3(a) of the Bank Holding•Com-
pany Act' makes it unlawful for a company to acquire control of a bank
without first obtaining the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board)."' The attainment of bank holding company status is
thus subject to the approval of the Board. On November 15, 1974, pursuant
to Board regulations," First Lincolnwood presented an application to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago to acquire control of the Lincolnwood Bank.'
Eighty-six percent. of the Bank's shares 8 were held by four individuals in a
voting trust." First Lincolnwood planned to issue its own shares to the same
four persons in exchange for their shares of stock in the Bank." In addition,
it planned to assume a $3.7 million debt. from the individuals and to issue
$1.5 million in capital notes.'' Since ownership would merely be transferred
' 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
2 A bank holding company is defined by the Bank Holding Company Act of
1954, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Stipp. II 1978). as "any company
which has control over any bank Id. 1841(a)(1) (1976). A company has control
over a bank if
(A) the company directly or indirectly	 owns, controls, or has
power to vote 25 per centum or inure of any class of voting securities of
the hank	 ;
(13) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of
the directors or trustees of the bank ... ; or
(C) the [Federal Reserve] Board determines ... that the company di-
rectly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management
or policies of the bank ....
Id. § 1841(a)(2).
First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
546 1".2d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated, 560 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1977) (en bane),
rev'd. 439 U.S. 234 (1978). The Bank was formed in Chicago in 1955, moved to Lin-
colnwood, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, in 1962, and had total assets of $71 million at the
end of 1974. Brief of the Respondent at 4-5, First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 439 U.S. 234 (1978). The Bank's deposits
amounted to $65.7 million, approximately two-tenths of one percent of the total
commercial-bank deposits in the Chicago area. 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 153, 153 (1976),
reprinted in 546 F.2d at 722-23.
1 12 U.S.C.	 1841-1850 (1976 & Stipp. II 1978) and 1.R.C. §§ 1101-1103
(original version at ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956)).
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (Stipp. II 1978).
" 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-.6, 262.1-.6 (1979). These regulations specify that bank
holding company applications must he submitted to the local Federal Reserve Bank in
each case. Id. §§ 225.3(a)-(b), 262.3(b)-(c), as amended, 44 Fed. Reg. 64,398, 64,399
(1979).
Brief of the Respondent at 5.
8 There were a total of 144,375 shares of common stock outstanding. 546
F.2d at 720.
" 439 U.S. at 237.
10 Id.
" Id. The proceeds from the sale of the capital notes would be used to
purchase additional shares to be issued by the Bank. Id.
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from these four individuals to a holding company owned by the same per-
sons, there would be no change in either control or management of the
Bank.' 2
The primary motivation for the proposed change in structure was the tax
savings that would result. Under the proposal, the holding company would
assume the four shareholders' $3.7 million debt which they incurred when
they acquired control of the Bank,' 3
 This debt was secured by the individu-
als' bank stock." Although the shareholders would not be relieved of ulti-
mate liability for the debt," such a restructuring of ownership interests would
allow the Bank and the holding company to file a consolidated tax return. On
this return the Bank and the holding company would realize a substantial tax
savings" by deducting the annual debt interest from the Bank's earned in-
come. Prior to this restructuring, the debt interest would be deducted from
the individuals' gross income, which presumably is less than that of the
Bank.' 7 Since deductions in excess of adjusted gross income are lost to the
taxpayer under the Internal Revenue Code,' 8 and interest on indebtedness
can be deducted only by the individual or entity that. pays and is liable for the
indebtedness,'" the interest deduction could be utilized more fully when de-
ducted front the Bank's greater income rather than from the individuals' per-
sona! income.'" The proposed change, therefore. could result in a greater
12
 546 F.2d at 720.
13 id.
Id. This debt, owed to the Central National Bank of Chicago, was incurred
when the individuals bought control of the Bank front the Bank's former owners and
managers after three of those principal officials, including the then-chairman and a
former president, were indicted for manipulating the Bank's stock (}n the American
Stock Exchange. 546 F.2d at 720; Brief for the Petitioner at 4 11.2. First Lincolnwood
Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.. 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
15 439 U.S. at 237 n.3. "I-he debt transfer would relieve the four individuals of
their primary obligations under the loans, but they would still be secondarily liable if'
the holding company defaulted and its liabilities exceeded the value of the Bank's
stock. Id.
'" Id. at 238. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, respondent and the
Bank would qualify as affiliated corporations, 1.R.C. § 1504, and therefore could file a
consolidated tax return, id. § 1501. Ott such a return, the interest on the $3.7 million
debt could be deducted from the income earned by the Bank when .calculating the
consolidated entity's taxable income. Id. § 163(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-11(a)(1) (1972).
The tax savings then could be transferred to respondent as a tax-free intercorporaie
dividend and used to retire the $3.7 million acquisition debt. I.R.C. § 243(a)(3), (b)(1);
Treas. Reg. § 1. 502-14(a)(1) (1972).
' 7 I.R.C. § 163(a).
Id. §§ 62, 63.
'" Id. § 163(a).
2" Alternatively, the individual shareholders could have deducted from their
personal income the interest payments on the debt, id. § 163, but such income proba-
bly was not great enough to permit the entire interest charge of nearly $300,000 to be
deducted. Based on an 8% annual interest rate and a corporate lax rate of 48%. re-
spondent contended that the lax savings would be $142,080. Brief of the Respondent
al 5-6 n.2. Furthermore, the assumption of the debt by the holding company placed
the cash flow Inirden of the interest payments ultimately on the Bank rather than on
the shareholders theniselves.
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tax savings to the shareholders than if the restructuring were not im-
plemented.
The Chicago Federal Reserve Bank formally accepted First Lin-
colnwood's application 21 on June 3, 1975, and a copy of the application was
sent to the Comptroller of the Currency. 22 The Chicago Reserve Bank's
evaluation concluded that the Lincolnwood bank's capital position was weak 23
and that the holding company might not be able to service adequately its own
debts without further weakening the capital and financial condition of its sub-
sidiary." Despite this conclusion, however, the Chicago Reserve Bank rec-
ommended approval of the holding company application 2!' due to the Lin-
colnwood bank's capable management, the promise by First Lincolnwood to
raise $1.5 million in capital for its subsidiary, 2" and the tax advantages which
would accrue to the Bank."
The Comptroller of the Currency made a separate evaluation and simi-
larly found that the Bank's capital position needed to be strengthened, and
that the Bank's earnings might not be great. enough to service the holding
company's proposed aggregate of long-term debt.28 Although his agency's
findings were essentially the same as those of the Chicago Reserve Bank, the
Comptroller concluded that the positive aspects of the transaction did not
outweigh sufficiently the negative ones, and hence recommended disap-
proval. 2"
21
 546 F.2d at. 720; 40 Fed. Reg. 26,587 (1975). See nine 6 supra.
22 546 F.2d at 720. The Board is required to solicit recommendations from
the Comptroller of the Currency if a national bank is involved. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b)
(Stipp. II 1978). The Board, however, is not bound by such recommendations. Whit-
ney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 419-21 (1965). The Comptrol-
ler shares overlapping jurisdiction with the Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). See text and notes at notes 221-35 infra. In particular, the Comp-
troller supervises nationally-chartered banks. 12 U.S.C. §.§ 21, 161(a), 481 (1976). Con-
gress, however. delegated exclusive authority in the bank holding company area to the
Board. Id. § 1842(a) (Stipp. II 1978). Due to the expertise of the Comptroller, how-
ever, Congress included in the Bank Holding Company Act a requirement that the
Board seek the recommendations of the Comptroller when a national bank is involved
in the proposed transaction. Id. § 1842(b).
23 439 U.S. at 239. The Board uses several methods to analyze the adequacy
of capital. One is the ratio of equity capital to total liabilities less cash on hand, known
as the invested-asset ratio. Another is the ratio of total capital, debt, anti equity, to total
assets, known as the capital-asset ratio. Id. at 239 n.6.
See id. at 239; Brief for the Petitioner at 6.
33
 439 U.S. at 239.
2 " Under this proposal, First Lincolnwood would issue $1.5 million in 17-year
capital notes, using the proceeds to purchase new shares to be issued by the Bank. Id.
at 237-38. The resulting increase in the Bank's capital would improve the Bank's capi-
tal adequacy. See note 23 supra.
27 439 U.S. at 239; Brief for the Petitioner at 6. See note 16 supra.
2" 439 U.S. at. 239; Brief for the Petitioner at. , 7. Respondent planned to retire
the debt with the dividends it would receive on its shares of Bank stock. 439 U.S. at
237.
2" 439 U.S. at 239.
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First Lincolnwood then modified its proposal by eliminating its plan to
issue $1.5 million in capital notes." Instead, the holding company proposed
that. the Bank itself issue $1 million in capital notes and $1.1 million in com-
mon stock."' This revision increased the total addition to the Bank's
capital—$2.1 million instead of $1.5 million — thereby improving the Bank's
capital position." 2 Since the new plan alleviated to some extent the previous
concerns about capital adequacy, both the Chicago Reserve Bank and the
Comptroller recommended that the First Lincolnwood application be ap-
proved."
Despite these recommendations, the staff of the Federal Reserve Board
recommended disapproval." 4 The primary reason For their recommendation
was that the Bank's capital position, before and after the proposed transac-
tion, did not meet the Board's requirements for capital adequacy.'''' There
was also the possibility that the principal shareholders, to maintain sufficient
control of the Bank, might have to borrow to purchase the additional shares
of new stock to be issued under the modified proposal.' The staff realized
that any further debt incurred by the individual shareholders in reality would
he borne by the holding company and the Bank. 37 It determined that this
added debt might impair the ability of the holding company to deal success-
Fully with any unforeseen problems that might arise at the Bank." The staff
of the Board concluded that the capital structure of the Bank was inadequate,
and that the holding company did not sufficiently strengthen it. 31 It there-
fore recommended disapproval.'"
30 Id. at 240. Respondent. still would issue, however, its own shares of stock in
exchange For the individuals' shares, and still would assume the $3.7 million debt. of
the individuals. See text and mites at notes 8-14 supra.
al 439 U.S. at 240. The four principal shareholders would purchase 15,756
shares of the new stock issue and would exchange them for First Lincolnwood's stock
so as to maintain the holding company's 80% ownership of the Bank. This amount was
the minimum necessary for parent and subsidiary companies to be considered "af-
filiated" and thereby eligible to file consolidated tax returns. I.R.C. § 1504; Brief for
the Petitioner at 7-8 n.9. See note 16 supra.
" 4311 U.S. at 240; Brief for the Petitioner at 8. Under the original proposal,
$1.5 million would have been added to the Bank's capital via the respondent's pur-
chase of $1.5 million in new Bank stock with the proceeds of the sale of the capital
notes. Id. The modified proposal, however, would add $2.1 million to the Bank's capi-
tal via the sale of $1 million in capital notes and $1.1 million in common stock; but the
increase in equity capital would be only $1.1 million instead of $1.5 million. Id. Two of
the Board's measures of capital adequacy are noted at note 23 supra.
33 439 U.S. at 240. The Chicago Reserve Bank, however, did consider the
modification to have a negative aspect in that it decreased the proposed addition to the
Bank's equity capital from $1.5 million to $1.1 million. Id.
34 Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 240. The Board has established certain ratios as the minimal levels of
capital necessary for a bank to remain financially sound. Id. at 239 n.6, 240 & n.8. In
First Lincoinwood's case, the Board staff estimated that neither restructuring proposal
would bring the Bank's capital position to those minimal levels. Id. at NO 11.8.
" Brief for the Petitioner at 8-9. See note 31 supra.
37 Brief for the Petitionc;r at 9.
38 439 U.S. at 240-41: 62 Fed. Res. Buil. at 154.
3" 439 U.S. at 241.
40 Id.
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Pursuant to the authority granted by section 3 of the Bank Holding
Company Act,'" the Board rejected the Chicago Reserve Bank and the Comp-
troller's advisory recommendations and adopted the findings and conclu-
sions of its own staff. The Board voted to deny approval of First Lin-
colnwood's application on January 9, 1976." In considering the statutory
scheme, the Board noted that section 3(c) of the Act provides two instances
where bank holding company applications shall not be approved." First, the
Board must deny approval to any acquisition, merger, or consolidation which
would either result in a monopoly or further the monopolization of bank-
ing. 44  second instance involves acquisitions, mergers, or consolidations
which tend to have anticompetitive effects. 4 " Here, the Board is again di-
rected to withhold approval, unless the anticompetitive effects are out-
weighed by a positive impact on the community to be served by the bank."
Section 3(c) ends with the directive that "idn every case, the Board shall take
into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future pros-
pects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the con-
venience and needs of the community to be served." 47 With respect to First
Lincolnwood, the Board concluded that, although there would he no
monopolizing or anticompetitive effects, consideration of this final aspect, fi-
nancial soundness, warranted disapproval." The Board's application of the
closing sentence of section 3(c) was embodied in its guideline that bank hold-
ing companies should be a source of financial and managerial strength to
their subsidiary banks." Reviewing the findings of its staff report, the Board
concluded that First Lincolnwood would not be able to provide such strength
and that its initial debt structure might even result in the weakening of the
financial condition of the Bank. 5 ° Therefore, the Board denied the applica-
tion on grounds of financial unsoundness."
41 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (Supp. II 1978).
42 439 U.S. at 241.
43 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976) (amended by Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 713, 94 Stat. 132, 190). See
note 262 infra.
44 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1) (1976).
45 Id. § 1842(c)(2).
411
47 In part, § 3(c) provides:
The Board shall not approve—
(I) any acquisition or merger or consolidation ... which would re-
sult in a monopoly, ... or
(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation
whose effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition ... unless ...
the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest ....
In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and
managerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies
and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the commu-
nity to be served.
Id. § 1842(c).
48 439 U.S. at 241; 62 Fed. Res. Bull. at 154.
4" 62 Fed. Res. Bull. at 153.
5" Id. at 154.
51 Id.
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Invoking the appeals provision of the Bank Holding Company Act,"
First Lincolnwood appealed the Board decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." A divided, three-judge panel affirmed the
Board's order. 54 The panel, however, did not question the legal basis for the
Board's order-whether the Board had the power under section 3(c) to deny
the application, given the facts of the case. 55
 Instead, it merely examined the
adequacy of the Board's factual findings of financial unsoundness." Basing
its decision on these narrow grounds, the panel found substantial evidence 57
to support the Board's order."
On rehearing en banc, 59
 however, the Seventh Circuit did question the
legal basis for the Board's decision and unanimously set aside that order."
The court observed that "the Board is empowered to deny approval of a hank
acquisition upon finding it not to be in the public interest for reasons other
than an anticompetitive tendency."' But the court. construed section 3(c) to
mean that "in order to be grounds for disapproval, the condition or tendency
deemed not to be in the public interest must be caused or enhanced by the
proposed transaction." 62 The court noted that First Lincolnwoocl's proposal
would not increase the acquisition debt, that it would result. in beneficial tax
savings, and that there would be no real change in ownership." Since the
proposal had no negative effects on financial or managerial resources that
were not already in existence, the court concluded that the Board had ex-
ceeded the authority granted it by Congress under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari," 5
 and, in reversing
the decision of the Seventh Circuit, FIELD: The Bank Holding Company Act
52 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1976). This section permits Board orders to be appealed
directly to the courts of appeals, bypassing the district courts. Id.
33 546 F.2d at 719.
" 439 U.S. at 241.
53
 546 F.2d at 720-22.
5" Id.
57
 The Bank Holding Company Act specifically mandates the use of the sub-
stantial evidence test. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1976). This test is a test of the reasonableness,
not the correctness, of agency findings of fact. See B. SCIMARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
595-96, 609 (1976).
38 546 F.2d at 720-21. The panel also rejected two other arguments raised by,
respondent, involving statutory and regulatory time periods. Id. at 721-22.
39 The panel issued its decision on December 7, 1976. Id. at 718. Rehearing
and rehearing en bane were granted three months later, on March 3, 1977. Id.
60 560 F.2d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc), reed, 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
The unanimity of the en bane decision was partially due to the fact that the two mem-
bers of the panel-decision majority Were not regular members of the Seventh Circuit
court, and therefore could not participate in its en bane decision: the Honorable Tont
C. Clark, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Retired, and the late Honor-
able John S. Hastings, Senior Circuit Judge. 546 F.2d at 719. Judge Hastings died on
February 7, 1977. 544 F.2d xvi (1976). two months before the en bane argument., 560
F.2d at 258.
'' 560 F.2d at 261.
62 Id. at 261-62.
63 Id. at 262.
" 4 hi. at 262-63.
" 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
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gives authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to
disapprove holding company applications solely on grounds of financial or
managerial unsoundness, (I) in the absence of anticompetitive effect 66 and (2)
"regardless of whether that unsoundness would he caused or exacerbated by
the proposed transaction." 67 Two justices dissented," arguing that disap-
proval based on financial or managerial unsoundness is permissible only when
that unsoundness results from or is enhanced by the proposed transaction."
The holding in First Lincolnwood is significant because it adopts the
broadest possible construction of the Federal Reserve Board's power to deny
an application by a hank holding company to acquire a batik under section
3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act.'" The Supreme Court. noted that
the federal bank regulatory agencies have overlapping jurisdictions, and that
Congress intended such duplicative powers.'' Furthermore, the Court reaf-
firmed its earlier holding in Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans 72
that. Congress intended the Board to be the primary bank holding company
regulator in the United States. 73
This casenote will examine the significance of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in First Lincolnwood and its ramifications for the commercial banking in-
dustry and the federal bank regulatory machinery. First, the casenote will
analyze the reasoning of the Court which led to the reversal of the Seventh
Circuit. It then will evaluate two related issues concerning the interpretation
of section 3(c). The first issue is whether the Board can disapprove a bank
holding company application solely on grounds of financial or managerial un-
soundness. The second issue is whether a denial based on financial or man-
agerial unsoundness can occur only when that unsoundness is created or en-
hanced by the proposed transaction. Finally, the Court's holding on this sec-
ond issue will be evaluated to determine its breadth. 74 Analysis will show that
the Court's resolution of this controversy was proper in all respects.
I. REASONING OF THE COURT IN FIRST LINCOLNWOOD
In First Lincolnwood, the Supreme Court interpreted the Bank Holding
Company Act as giving broad authority to the Federal Reserve Board in the
"" 439 U.S. at 243. 248.
" 7 Id. at 252. justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court which was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and justices Brennan, Stewart, White. Blackmun, and
Powell. Id. at 235.
18 Id. at 254. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id.
"" Id. at 254-55.
7 " Id. at 252.
71
 Id. at 250-51.
" 379 U.S. 411 (i965).
73 439 U.S. at 250. See text at notes 98-103 infra.
" justice Marshall reacted to the dissenting opinion by adding a footnote to
the Court's opinion, noting that, even if the Court accepted the dissent's position, the
transaction at issue would have had a present negative effect—that of creating a fi-
nancially unsound bank holding company. 439 U.S. at 252 n.18. The dissent re-
sponded with a Footnote of its own. Id. at 258 n.6. In it the dissenters suggested that
the majority had limited its holding to situations where the proposed transaction has
the effect of creating ;_t financially unsound holding company. Id.
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area of bank holding company regulation. Writing for the majority, Justice
Marshall 75
 noted that certiorari had been granted clue to the adverse impact
of the Seventh Circuit's holding on the Board's ability to carry out its regula-
tory duties under the Act.'" With this concern in mind, the Court first
examined respondent's contention that the Act did not grant authority to the
Board to deny applications for holding company status solely on grounds of
financial or managerial unsoundness, but that the Board must find evidence
of an anticompetitive effect. 77 To support its contention, respondent noted
that section 3(c) had been amended in 1966 78 to conform with that year's
amendments to the corresponding provision" of the Bank Merger Act.'" Re-
spondent claimed that, since the Bank Merger Act amendments were in-
tended to allow alternative grounds for approval of an otherwise impermissi-
ble anticompetitive merger, the Bank Holding Company Act amendments had
a similar purpose. 8 ' First Lincolnwood maintained that the Board's authority
to consider financial unsoundness as a ground for denial was limited to cases
where an anticompetitive effect was found. 82
The Court rejected this analogy, finding it contrary to the language of
the statute. 83
 The Court emphasized that section 3(c) specifies that financial
and managerial factors are to be considered in every case, not just in cases in
which it is found that the transaction probably will have an anticompetitive
effect. 84 The Court compared the amended wording of section 3(c) to that of
the original 1956 version" which had listed the financial history and condi-
tion of the applicant holding company and its proposed subsidiary banks as
one of five factors to be considered in determining whether to approve the
application. 86 . Accordingly, the Court concluded that the final sentence of the
1966 amendment to section 3(c) was intended to retain financial unsoundness
as an independent ground for disapproval. 87
In reaching this conclusion, the Court also examined the legislative his-
tory of section 19 of the Banking Act of 1933, 88 the predecessor of the Bank
73 Id. at 235.
76 Id. at 242.
77 Id. Though arguing for affirmance of the en bane decision, First Lin-
colnwood disagreed with the Seventh Circuit here and reiterated its argument, based
on its interpretation of § 3(c), that "the Board has no authority to deny bank holding
company status in the absence of some anti-competitive or anti-cartel considera-
tion ...." Brief of the Respondent at 21.
" Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, §
7(c), 80 Stat. 236, 237-38 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976)).
79
 Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 7, 8 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1976)).
89
 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976 & Stipp. 11 1978) (originally enacted as the Bank
Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129); 439 U.S. at 242-43.
8 ' 439 U.S. at 243.
82 Id.
82 Id.
84 Id.
85
 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 3(c), 70 Stat. 133, 135
(current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976)).•
86
 439 U.S. at 244.
87 Id. at 245-46.
88
 Ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 162, 186-88 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 61
(1976)).
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Holding Company Act.sa This section required every bank holding company
to obtain a permit from the Board before it could vote the shares of a na-
tional bank." The Board could refuse to grant the permit on grounds of
financial unsoundness."' The legislative history, the Court noted, indicated
that Congress repealed these voting permit provisions in 1966" because it
believed that section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act gave the Board
even broader authority to ensure the financial and managerial soundness of
holding companies and their subsidiary banks." Thus, the Court concluded
that Congress did not intend to require the Board to find an anticompetitive
effect before it could disapprove the acquisition of a bank by a holding com-
pany under section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act."'
Having rejected respondent's first contention, the Court then considered
whether a bank holding company application may be denied on grounds of
financial or managerial unsoundness only when that unsoundness has been
caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction." 5 Unlike the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court construed the "in every case" language to en-
compass cases in which the proposed transaction would weaken neither the
bank nor the bank holding company.• In support of this construction, the
Court noted the general legislative mandate which Congress had given the
Board as a result of its "substantial concern for the financial soundness of the
banking system." 7 The Court concluded that the congressional desire to en-
sure the soundness of the banking system would be furthered best by allowing
the Board to require holding company applicants and subsidiary banks to
meet minimum capital adequacy standards in all possible cases."
Having concluded that the Board's policy was consistent with general
congressional concerns, the Court. next examined respondent's contention that
day-to-day regulatory authority over national banks is the responsibility of the
Comptroller of the Currency,"" and that the Board should not share in that
89
 439 U.S. at 243-44.
"a Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 162, V86-88 (current version at
12 U.S.C. § 61 (1976)).
"' Id. at 186-87.
" 2 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-485, §
13(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242-43 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1976)).
93
 439 U.S. at 246-47.
94 Id. at 248. This conclusion sidestepped the question whether Congress in-
tended to impose such a limitation on the 1(a) criteria of the Bank Merger Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1976), as the respondent's argument had assumed. In a footnote,
however, the Court implied a similarly negative answer to the question. Reviewing the
legislative history of the 1966 amendments to the Bank Merger Act, justice Marshall
dismissed, as possibly "unwarranted," respondent's assumption that banking regulators
applying the Bank Merger Act can consider financial and managerial factors only as
they bear upon competitive considerations." 439 U.S. at 245 n.11. See text at notes
167-83 infra.
9"
 439 U.S. at 249.
m Id. at 249-50.
97 Id. at 250,
98 Id.
99 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
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authority by questioning capital adequacy.'"" Citing its decision in Whitney
National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans,'" the Court noted that the Board's
jurisdiction is paramount in the area of bank holding company regulation."'
It was apparent to the Court that Congress intended the Board to have broad
power concerning bank holding companies. 103
 Thus, the Court concluded
that the Board's powers could overlap those of the Comptroller, and that the
Board could use its holding company approval power as a regulatory lever to
effect indirectly changes which the Comptroller could order directly.t 04
To support its conclusion regarding congressional intent, the Court re-
ferred to the principle of judicial "defer[ence] to an agency's construction of
its own statutory mandate ..., particularly when that construction accords
with well-established congressional goals."'' The Court observed that the
Board had long used its power to deny applicants the advantages of holding
company status to induce applicants to improve their own capital position and
that of their subsidiaries.'"" It commented that "Congress has been made
aware of this practice, yet four times has 'revisited the Act and left the prac-
tice untouched.' " 107 Hence, the Court maintained that, since Congress did
not change the relevant provision when it amended the statute in other
places, it could be assumed that Congress agreed with the agency's interpreta-
tion of that provision. 118
In a dissent joined by justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens "" essentially
adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit's en bane decision that the fi-
nancial unsoundness must be created or enhanced by the proposed transac-
'"" 439 U.S. at 250; Brief of the Respondent at 14, 21.
0
 379 U.S. 411 (1965). In Whitney, the Board had approved a holding com-
pany application, but competitors of the bank sought to restrain the Comptroller from
issuing the necessary certificate because of a change in state law. Id. at 413-14. The
Court held that the Board's authority was paramount in the holding company area
and that any reconsideration of the granting of the application should be done before
the Board. Id. at 423.
1 " 2
 439 U.S. at 250-51.
103 Id.
' 04 Id. at 251.
105 Id. (citations omitted).
106 Id .
'"7 Id. at 248 (quoting Saxhe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974)),
1 " Id. at 248. The Court concluded its opinion by examining and rejecting
respondent's contention that the Board's decision,had been arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 252-53. In reviewing the Board's fact determination, the Court found in [the]
record more than the amount of evidence 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support [the Board's] conclusions.' " Id. at 253 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). According to § 10(e) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), an agency action shall be set aside if the review-
ing court finds it to have been "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion ...." The
Bank Holding Company Act specifically mandates the use of the substantial evidence
test to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. 12 id. § 1848. This
test is a test of the reasonableness, not the correctness, of agency findings of fact. See
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 595-96, 609 (1976).
100
 439 U.S. at 254.
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Lion.'" The dissent first maintained that the Board had overstepped the
bounds of its authority by using its approval power to force banks and their
holding companies to bring their financial positions up to Board stan-
dards.'" The dissent noted that the language of section 3(c) confined the
Board's authority to the evaluation of the effects of proposed bank holding
company transactions,'" and that the "in every case" provision must be read
in the context of that language.'" Justice Stevens emphasized that denial of
an application for pre-existing financial unsoundness was not based on an
effect and hence was outside the scope of the Board's authority." 4 The dis-
senting opinion noted that the general structure of federal banking legislation
clearly granted "day-to-day regulatory jurisdiction over existing financial and
managerial conditions at national banks" to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency."' It maintained that the Court's holding improperly delegated some of
this authority to the Board."" The dissent also viewed the legislative history
cited by the Court as too "sparse" to be of any help to the Board's construc-
tion of the Bank Holding Company Act,'' Justice Stevens insisted that the
legislative history did not support a conclusion that Congress intended the
Board's authority to be as wide-ranging as the majority claimed it was.'" He
concluded that the majority's decision rested far too heavily on the principle
that courts should defer to an agency's own construction of its statutory pow-
ers.'" In essence, the dissent stated that there should be no judicial defer-
ence to an agency's erroneous construction of its statutory mandate, even
when Congress has "revisited" the Act and then left the provision at issue
unchanged. 21 0
II. FACTORS To BE CONSIDERED IN REVIEWING
BANK HOLDING COMPANY APPLICATIONS
In analyzing the existence and scope of the Board's power to deny appli-
cations solely on grounds of pre-existing financial unsoundness, it will be re-
called that the Court first had to consider respondent's argument that the
Board's disapproval power under section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company
Act was limited to cases where an anticompetitive effect is present.' 2 ' The
Court chose to take that section's last sentence—the "in every case"
provision—at face value. In the Court's view, the use of these words clearly
1 " 1(1. at 254-55. Without so stating, justice Stevens agreed with the majority
that financial and managerial resources may be considered by the Board in the ab
sence of anticompetitive effects, as he confined his dissent solely to this second issue.
"' Id. at 254.
12
 Id. at 255.
114 id .
" 5 Id. at 256.
116
17 Id. at 257.
1 " Id.
119 Id .
1211 Id,
121 Id .
 at 242. See text at notes 77-94 supra.
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indicated that Congress intended the Board to consider financial and man-
agerial factors in all cases, and that these factors alone could lead to denial of
a holding company application.' 22 This conclusion will now be examined to
determine whether it is sound.
In part, section 3(c) provides:
The Board shall not approve—
(1) any acquisition or merger or consolidation ... which
would result in a monopoly, ... or
(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation
... whose effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition ...
unless ... the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions
are clearly outweighed in the public interest ....
In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial
and managerial resources and future prospects of the company or
companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.'"
As the Court observed, this section resulted from amendments to the Act in
1966 to bring the Act into conformity with the corresponding provision of the
Bank Merger Act.'"
It is first instructive to note that an alternative construction, leading to a
conclusion that the Board can deny approval only when it finds an anticom-
petitive effect, is possible. 125 This alternative construction would hold that
section 3(c) calls for a two-tiered test. The first. tier of such a test would in-
volve a determination by the Board as to whether the proposed acquisition,
merger, or consolidation would have an anticompetitive effect. If no such ef-
fect were found to be probable, the application would have to he granted. If
anticompetitive effects were determined to be probable, however, the Board,
under the second tier of this test, would have to weigh those effects against
(I) the possible benefits to the community and (2) the financial resources,
managerial resources, and future prospects of the holding company and its
proposed subsidiary bank or banks.' 26
 If the anticompetitive effects were
found to outweigh either or both of the latter criteria, the Board would have
to disapprove the transaction. Under this view, the final sentence of section
3(c) merely becomes part of the weighing process designed to determine
whether an anticompetitive acquisition should he approved.
This alternative interpretation lacks foundation in terms of statutory con-
struction, legislative intent, and judicial precedent. Indeed, the very structure
of section 3(c) belies such an interpretation. In reviewing the schema of that.
122 439 U.S. at 252.
123
 12 U.S.C.	 1812(c) (1976).
124 Id. § 1828(c) (1976 t4,: Supp. II 1978) (originally enacted as the Bank Merger
Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129); 439 U.S. at 243.
125
 This construction is what First Lincolnwood argued when it maintained (hat
the Board had erred "by considering the unnumbered subparagraph of [section 3(c)1
as providing for it a separate head of jurisdiction. um -ailed to the first two considera-
tions set forth in the statute ....- Brief of the Respondent at 19.
12 " 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976).
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section, it is important to note that there is no weighing process in subsection
(1). 127 Rather, if the Board finds that the transaction would result. in or lead
to a monopoly, it must disapprove the application.'" Subsection (2), how-
ever, does include a weighing process whereby anticompetitive effects may be
weighed against possible benefits to the community.'" Thus, since there is
no weighing process in subsection (1), respondent's interpretation would con-
fine the relevance of the final sentence of section 3(c) to the weighing process
of subsection (2), even though the sentence is contained in neither subsection,
but instead applies to the section as a whole. This view of the unnumbered
paragraph as merely a part of subsection (2), rather than as an independent.
part of section . 3(c), is not supported by the physical structure of the stat-
ute.'" A glance at the text of the statute reveals that the unnumbered
paragraph is flush to the margin, rather than indented as the numbered
paragraphs are."' This structure indicates that its application is independent.
of the two subsections. Positioned in this mariner, the closing sentence has
general application in the context of section 3(c). Had the "in every case"
provision been indented, it would have come within the scope of the directive
of section 3(c)'s opening line, which applies only to the two subsections, and
therefore it could be argued that the sentence could apply only when the two
subsections are applicable. Since it was not indented, the provision does not
appear dependent on either subsection (1) or subsection (2), and it therefore
transcends both subsections. Thus, the Board can deny applications on
grounds of financial unsoundness even in the absence of anticompetitive ef-
fect.
The Court's upholding of the Board's interpretation of section 3(c) is
supportable not only in terms of statutory construction, but also on the
ground that it furthers the congressional intent. First Lincolnwood's interpre-
tation clearly would limit the Board's discretion by effectively mandating pro
forma approval of all applications which do not have anticompetitive effects.
Such a result would frustrate the purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act
and the 1970 amendments 132 to that Act which brought one-hank holding
companies within its scope.'" The Act was enacted in 1956 134 to control the
acquisition of banks and to restrict the non-banking activities of holding com-
panies,' 3 ' but this regulatory power extended only to multi-hank holding
companies.'" Many banks took advantage of this limitation and formed
127 Id. § I842(c)(1).
128
12)' Id. § 1842(c)(2).
"" Id. § l842(c). See text at note 123 SlIpM
131 Id,
"2 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §§
101-100, 84 Stat. 1700 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976)).
"" 439 U.S. at 247.
134 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240. 70 Stat. 133 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. 1:;§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Stipp. II 1978) and I.R.C. §§ 1101-1103).
"' Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law qf Rank Mergers, 14 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 213. 260 (1972).
"" Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133, 133
(current version at 12 U.S.C. 	 l841(a)(1) (1976)).
728	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:7 15
one-bank holding companies so that they would not have to seek the Board's
approval and be subject to the strictures of section 3(c).' 37
 In response, Con-
gress amended the Act in 1970 to include (me-bank holding companies within
its scope,'" thereby closing the so-called "loophole." 13"
In amending the statute, however, Congress did not change the criteria
for disapproval in section 3(c) of the Act.."" It must therefore have thought.
them fully applicable to the newly-covered one-bank holding companies. Vet,
the formation of a one-bank holding company usually will have no anticom-
petitive effects since there is usually no change in control or management."'
Indeed this is exactly the case in First Lincolnwood. If respondent were correct
in contending that applications cannot be denied in the absence of anticom-
petitive effect, then the Board would have to approve virtually all one-bank
holding company applications while scrutinizing only multi-bank holding
company applications. This would make the 1970 amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act. which brought one-bank holding companies within its
scope 142 virtually meaningless. Congress could not have intended such a re-
sult. Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history of the 1970 amendments
suggests that Congress intended to establish a different rule for one-bank
holding companies. 143
The Board's interpretation of the intent of section 3(c) also finds support
when one looks at its predecessor, section 19 of the Banking Act of 1933.' 44
That section required bank holding companies to obtain a permit from the
Board in order to vote the shares of a national bank.'" Before it could grant
such a permit, the Board was directed to consider the applicant's financial
condition.' 46 After obtaining a voting permit, the holding company became
subject to examination by the Board and had to maintain a prescribed reserve
of liquid assets.'" The Board, however, could revoke the permit if it. deter-
mined that the holding company affiliate had violated any provisions of the
Banking Act of 1933. 148 Thus, the Board could deny or revoke the permit
solely on grounds of financial unsoundness.'" Section 19, therefore, per-
formed the same function as the last sentence of section 3(c) does today.
137
 Kintner & Hansen„vupra note 135, at 260.
I" H Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-607, §
11)1, 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
	 I841(a)(1) (1976)).
"" Legislation Note, The. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments if 1970, 39 Grit.
Waste. L. Rry. 1200, 1201 (1971).
' 4 " 439 U.S. at 247. Section 3(c) was enacted in its present form in 1966. Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(c), 80 Stat. 236,
237-38 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976)).
141
 Brief for the Petitioner at. 22-23.
142 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, **
101-106, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. ** 1841-1850 (1076)).
14" 439 U.S. at 247.
' 44
 Ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat 162, 186-88 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 61
(1976)).
145
 Id. at 186.
1411
147
 Id. at 187.
146 Id. at 188.
14 " 439 U.S. at 243-44.
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The voting permit provisions of section 19, however, had a much nar-
rower scope than the present statutory structure. They applied only when the
holding company actually attempted to vote the shares of the subsidiary hank
and the bank had a national charter.'''" If the holding company could con-
trol the bank without actually voting its shares, or if its subsidiary was not a
national bank, the Board could not oversee its financial structure.' 5 ' Con-
gress remedied this situation by enacting the Bank Holding Company Act in
1956. 15 ' The new statute accomplished two things. First, it increased the
scope of the Board's control to encompass every instance in which a multi-
bank holding company desired to acquire a bank.' 33 Second, the Act made
anticompetitive effect. a ground for denying the acquisition, in addition to the
already-existing criterion of financial soundness.'" The Board was thereby
empowered to deny applications for reasons of anticompetitive effect even
when the financial condition of the holding company and its subsidiary bank
warranted approval.' 55 Later, when section 3(c) was revised to its current
form,'" Congress simultaneously repealed the voting permit provisions.'" It
did so because, in its view, section 3(c) gave the Board the same power to
deny acquisitions solely on grounds of financial unsoundness as the voting
permit provisions, but now that power applied more broadly.'" Respon-
dent's argument thus turned the legislative history on its head. Financial un-
soundness has been an independent ground for denying the application of a
holding company to control a bank since 1933.' 59 Congress added anticom-
petitive effect as a second independent ground when it passed the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act of 1956. 160 Thus, congressional intent in the area of bank
holding company acquisitions is furthered by the Board's interpretation of
section 3(c).
The Court's conclusion here is supported not only by legislative history
but also by past judicial precedent. First Lincolnwood was not the first case in
which a court agreed with the Board's interpretation of section 3(c). 161 in
' 5" Id. at 244.
1 " Id.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Stipp. lI 1978) and I.R.C. §§ 1101-1103).
1" Id.	 3(a), 70 Stat. at 134 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1976)).
'54 Id. § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 135 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § I842(c) (1976)).
155 Id .
156 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976). Sec note 47 supra.
' 57 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, §
13(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242-43 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1976)); 439 U.S. at 246.
1514 439 U.S. at 246.
159 Id. at 245.
no Id .
1 " See Grandview, Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 550 F.2d 415, 421 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 821 (1977). First Lin-
colnwood is also not the first time the Board has denied an application on grounds of
financial unsoundness, despite the absence of an anticompetitive effect. See Bankshares
of Hawley, Inc., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 610, 610-11 (1976) (nonoperating corporation was
organized for the purpose of becoming a holding company through the acquisition of
already-operating hank); Citizens Bancorp, 61 id. 806, 807 (1975) (nonoperating cor-
poration was organized for the purpose of becoming a holding company through the
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Grandview Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Board's approval of
an application from a bank holding company.'" 3 While First Lincolnwood in-
volved the acquisition of an already-existing bank by a newly-formed holding
company,'" Grandview involved the acquisition of a new bank by an already-
operating holding company.'"'' But in Grandview, as in First Lincolnwood, the
Board initially determined that there would be no anticompetitive effect.''
Such a determination, it was held, did not require automatic approval.'" 7 The
Eighth Circuit stated in dictum that section 3(c) required the Board to consider
financial soundness; even where there is no possibility of an anticompetitive
effect.'"
An earlier decision '"" of the Ninth Circuit, interpreting section 1(a) of
the Bank Merger Act of 1966,' 7 " is also relevant, since that section is identical
to section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act.' 7 ' It should be remem-
bered that First Lincolnwood argued that the Bank Merger Act and the Bank
Holding Company Act both required the appropriate agency to approve the
application at hand if there were no anticompetitive effects, regardless of fi-
nancial unsoundness.' 72 In Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp.,' 7" however, the Ninth Circuit indicated otherwise in the con-
text of the Bank Merger Act.' 74
 In that case, the court of appeals affirmed a
federal district court order enjoining the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) ' 75
 from withholding its approval of a bank merger.'" The
FDIC initially had denied approval on anticompetitive grounds because of its
acquisition of already-operating bank); Midwest. Bancorporation, Inc., 56 id. 948-50
(1970) (multi-bank holding company desired to acquire a third hank); Mid-Continent
Bancorporation, 52 id. 198, 203 (1966) (nonoperating corporation was organized for
the purpose of becoming a holding company through the acquisition of two already-
operating banks from their respective one-bank holding companies); Clayton
Bancshares Corp., 50 id. 1261, 1267 (1964) (one-bank holding company desired to
acquire two banks from their respective one-bank holding companies).
1i2 550 F.2(1 415 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 821 (11)77).
"" 550 F.2d at 422.
431) U.S. at 237-38.
550 F.2d at 417.
''"' 14, at 420; 439 U.S. at 941.
" 7 550 F.2d at 421.
16r. id .
"'" Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 482 F.2d 451)
(9th Cir. 1973).
' 7 " 12 U.S.C.	 1828(c)(5) ( 1 976 )•
' 71
 Id. § 1842(c). See note 47 .supra.
172 439 U.S. at 242-43.
17 ' 482 F.2d 159 (9th (;ir. 1973).
17 	Iii. at 465.
'" The FDIC is one of three banking agencies charged with enforcement of
the Bank Merger Act. 12 § I828(c)(2)((:) (I 976). The other two agencies are the
Comptroller of the Currency, id. § I828(c)(2)(A), and the Federal Reserve Board. id. §
1828(c)(2)(B). The FDIC supervises federally-insured, state nonmember banks. includ-
ing mutual savings banks. /4. §§ I813(a). (h), (1), (h). 1817(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 11
1978).
' 7 ' 482 F.2d at 465.
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concern that such approval would set a precedent for approval of additional
mergers in highly concentrated markets.'" The district court reversed the.
FDIC order clue to the arbitrariness of the agency's competitiveness test which
used the entire state of Washington as the relevant geographic market.' 78 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court on this point.' 79 The court went
on to comment, however, that "[t]he final paragraph of [the provision analog-
ous to the "in every case" language in section 3(c)] recognizes that the FDIC
retains its traditional role of evaluating banking factors. All bank supervisory
agencies can reject merger applications if the banking factors are unfavorable
whether or not a potential antitrust violation is present."'" Although the
court recognized this broad supervisory authority, the FDIC had made no
attempt to disapprove the merger on these grounds.'" The court therefore
refused to enforce the FDIC order. The Ninth Circuit observation implies
that a bank supervisory agency can reject merger applications solely on
grounds of financial unsoundness, even when there is no anticompetitive ef-
fect.'"
Thus, three circuits share the view that the crucial "in every case" para-
graph found in both the Bank Holding Company Act 183 and the Bank Merger
Act 184 allows the respective government agencies to disapprove applications
solely on grounds of financial unsoundness. This would seem to indicate a
uniform approach to the statutory construction of this provision which re-
sulted from the 1966 amendments to both Acts.'" The Supreme Court's
decision on this issue therefore is supported by statutory construction, legisla-
tive history, and judicial precedent.
III. FINANCIAL AND MANAGERIAL UNSOUNDNESS
NOT REQUIRED To BE AN EFFECT OF
THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION
The second part of the Court's decision in First Lincolnwood considered
whether the Board's power to disapprove applications solely on grounds of
financial unsoundness is limited to situations where that unsoundness is
created or exacerbated by the proposed transaction.'" First Lincolnwood ar-
gued that lac Board should not be allowed to disapprove the formation of
177 Id. at 461.
17 " 347 F. Stipp. 790, 800 (W.D. Wash. 1972), afrd, 482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1073). -
17" 482 F.2d at 464-65.
"" Id. at 4415.
181 Id .
1442 Id.
1" 12 U.S.C. § I842(c) (1976).
184 Id. § 1828(c)(5).
' 85 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. I.., No. 89-985, §
7(c), 80 Slat. 236, 237-38 (codified at 12 U.S.C. I842(c) (1976)); Bank Merger Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 7, 8 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § I828(c)(5)
(1976)).
"" 430 U.S. at 252.
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a one bank holding company when it cannot demonstrate any difference in
the banking situation, in the public convenience or in the competitive factors
before or after the formation of the holding company." '"' Thus, respondent
maintained that the Board could use the unnumbered paragraph of section
3(c) to reject holding company applications only when the financial or man-
agerial unsoundness results from the proposed transaction itself.'" It will be
shown that this contention has no basis in either statutory construction or
legislative history.
In terms of statutory construction one can see that section 3(c) mandates
the consideration of financial and managerial factors, and of future prospects,
in every case.'" Such a reading emphasizes the plain language of the statute
and gives no indication of any "present effect" limitation on the Board's
power. It is, indeed, a principle of statutory construction that effect be given
to each word in the statute;'" it is assumed that no part of the statute was
intended to be inoperative, superfluous, or void. '"' For the words "in every
case" to have their fullest possible meaning, they. should be construed to ex-
tend to situations where the financial unsoundness predated the application
and the proposed transaction does not improve that situation in any manner.
There is, however, an even more persuasive reason for construing sec-
tion 3(c) in this fashion. Such an interpretation accords with a repeatedly ex-
pressed congressional intent to do everything possible to ensure the safety of
the banking system.'" A construction of a banking regulatory statute that
construes the regulatory power in the broadest possible sense implements this
intent. Section 3(c) must. be read in the context of banking statutes and bank
regulation in general.'" 3 These statutes arc the result of Congress's concern
for the financial soundness of the banking system.'" The Court's decision
on the transactional issue properly furthers this congressional intent in a way
that is beneficial to the financial community and bank depositors in general.
187
 Brief of the Respondent at 9.
HN
'" 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976). See note 47 supra.
19° 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND S'EATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed.
1973) (A Revision of the Third Edition of SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONST'RUCT'ION).
191 hi.
" 2 439 U.S. at 250.
' 83 See, e.g., the Federal Reserve Act's membership provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 329
(1976), the insurance coverage provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, id. §§
1811-1832 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978), and the provisions of the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
"4 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY & INTEREST RATE CONTROL. Acr, H.R. REP. No.
95-1383, 95th Cong. 2d Sess„ reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONC. & An. NEws 9273,
9280-82, 9288-89, 9291; HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, REPORT ON BANK
MERGER Act . , H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 1860, 1861: S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), re-
printed in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2482, 2482-83; H.R. REP. No. 2564,
81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1950] U.S. CoDE GONG. SERV. 3765, 3765-66. See also
text and notes at notes 206 & 213-15 infra.
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The congressional concern for bank safety dates back to the post-World
War I era.'"' During the l920's and the early 1930's, an epidemic of hank
failures began in the rural areas of the nation and then spread to the cities.
Approximately 15,000 banks failed during that period.'" In the early 1930's
alone, approximately 9,000 banks failed and 2.300 more were absorbed by
mergers." This banking crisis'''" led to the bank holiday of March [CM,'"
the Emergency Banking Relief Act. of 1933, 200 and the Banking Act of
1935. 2 " The federal actions were successful, and the banking situation
stabilized during the middle 1930's. 292 As a result of this crisis, a basic com-
ponent of federal bank legislation has been the requirement. that bank agen-
cies review the financial condition of banks and bank holding companies to
protect the public and, in particular, bank depositors. 213 A prime example of
such legislation are statutes which give regulatory agencies the power to over-
see the financial conditions of banks and their holding companies and which
force them, directly or indirectly, to conform to certain standards. The result
of these provisions is a regulatory framework with overlapping authority
granted to various agencies. 2 "4
The system of bank regulation continued into the 1950's when bank
holding companies began to develop.' Congress reacted by enacting the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956, 2 " ( I) to control the acquisition of banks
by holding companies and (2) to restrict the non-banking activities of holding
companies."' Its ultimate purpose was to ensure further the soundness of
the banking system by extending the scope of regulation. 2 " As the legislative
history shows, the Act was considered necessary "because of the importance of
the banking system to the national economy ... [and because] banking ac-
tivities are carried on to a large extent by the use of depositors' funds rather
than by the use of equity capital subscribed by bank shareholders." ! 1 '' To
I" Leavitt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, 90 BANKING L. J. 632. 633-35
(1973).
I" Shull & Horvitz, The Bank Merger Act of 1960: A Decade After, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 859, 863 (1971).
197 Id. at 863-64.
I" See Franklin D. Roosevelt's first inaugural address (delivered March 4,
1933), reprinted in COMM. (.)N Flutist: ADMINISTRATION, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES Of THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-208, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 235,
235-37 (1974).
'"" Pres. Proc. 2039. 31 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1979); Pres. Proc. 204(1, id. § 120.2.
2 " Ch. I, 48 Stat. 1 (1933) (current version codified in scattered sections of l2,
50 app. U.S.C.).
2" Ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (current version codified in scattered sections
of 11, 12, 15, 39 U.S.C.),
292 Shull & Horvitz, supra note 196, at 864.
2113 Leavitt, supra note 195, at 633.
204 Id. at 635.
' 2" Id. at 635-36.
2"G
	 Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976 & Stipp. It 1978) and I.R.C. §§ 1101-1103).
207 Kintner & Hansen, supra note 135, at 260.
203
	
439 U.S. at 244, 250.
"" S. REP. No. 1095. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in 11956] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2482, 2482-83.
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carry out the purposes of the Act as uniformly as possible, the Act's regula-
tory authority was delegated to one agency, the Federal Reserve Board. 2 "
By such delegation, Congress foreclosed the possibility that a bank holding
company would tailor the characteristics of a bank affiliate to fall within the
jurisdiction of the agency whose interpretation would be most desirable for
that particular transaction.'" Hence, in the context of holding companies,
Congress desired the Board's power to be paramount so that it could impose
financial requirements on banks and holding companies desiring approval of
a proposed transaction.
A broad interpretation of Congress's delegation of power to the Board is
reasonable and proper in light of the legislative history of federal bank legisla-
tion. The preamble to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 called for "a more
effective supervision of banking in the United States ...." 212 The Banking
Act of 1933 created the FDIC to protect bank deposits and to instill public
confidence in the banking system.'" In addition, when the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act 214 was amended in 1950;2 ' 5 a House committee report praised
the effectiveness of the FDIC."'" The goal of a sound financial system was
further expressed when Congress consideredamendments to banking statutes
in 1966 217 and 1978. 218 It is evident. that Congress has long been concerned
about the safety of the nation's banking system. The history of congressional
concern for bank safety and the responsibility delegated to the Board to en-
sure this safety therefore would support a broad interpretation of the Board's
authority under the Bank Holding Company Act.
Although it is clear that. Congress has been concerned with the sound ness
of the banking system 21 " and that. it entrusted the enforcement, of' the Bank
Holding Company Act to the Roard, 22° First Lincolnwood argued that Con-
gress intended the various banking „agencies' areas of jurisdiction to be mutu-
ally exclusive and non-c.werlapping. 224 It maintained that the Board's
interpretation of its power extended too far,'" that allowing the Board to
2 " Kintner & Hansen, supra note 135, at 262-63.
211 Id. at 262.
212 Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (1913) (current version
codified in scattered sections of 12, 31 U.S.C.).
213 Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions and
Philosophy, 31 LAW & CONT EM P. PROB. 696, 698-99 (1966).
2" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
213 Act of September 21, 1950, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873.
2" H.R. REP. No. 2564, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19!")0] U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 3765, 3765-66.
217 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, REPORT ON BANK MERGER ACT,
H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 1860, 1861.
21"
 HousE Comm. (IN BANKING, FINANCE. & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY & INTEREST RATE CONTROL ACT, H.R. REP. No. 95-
1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. Com: CONG. Ni:ws 9273,
9280-82.
21"
 439 U.S. at 250.
22° 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (Supp. II 1978).
221 439 U.S. at 250: Brief of the Respondent at 14-15, 21.
222 id.
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disapprove holding company applications solely on the ground of financial un-
soundness not created or exacerbated by the proposed transaction improperly
involved the Board in areas which Congress had delegated exclusively to the
Comptr011er of the Currency."" A review of the banking laws, though, belies
the validity of respondent's interpretation of congressional intent.
It is true, of course, that day-to-day responsibility for the examination of
banks is divided among the various banking agencies. 224 There is also, how-
ever, much duplication in banking regulation, partly because the United
States has a dual system of banking under which banks are subject to federal
regulation or state regulation, or both. 225 Under this system, banks have the
options of (1) seeking a national or state charter, 22 " (2) being or not being
members of the Federal Reserve System, 227 and (3) having or not having fed-
eral deposit insurance'. 228 As a result, depending on the decisions made by
the banks, the various agencies' jurisdictions may overlap. For example, if a
bank applies for and receives a national charter, it thereby subjects itself to
regulation by three federal agencies. 22" This overlapping of regulatory pow-
ers developed partly because the national-bank system was established in 1863
by the National Bank Act, 23" while the Federal Reserve System was not estab-
lished until fifty years later by the Federal Reserve Act."' In 1933 the Fed-
223
224 Randall, supra note 213, at 708. The Comptroller examines nationally-
chartered banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 161(a), 48i (1976). The Federal Reserve Board
examines state-chartered banks that arc members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. §§
221, 248(a), 338. The FDIC examines all other banks that have federal deposit insur-
ance. Id. §§ 1811, 1817(a)(l), 1820(b) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
225 Davis, Banking Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 I.,Aw & CONTEMP. PROB.
639, 642-43 (1966). See also Bell, Slate Regulation of Commercial Banks, 26 Bus. LAW. 109
(1970).
22" 12 U.S.C. §§ 35, 214a, 328 (1976). See Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study
in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 749, 754-60 (1966).
227 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). Only state-chartered banks, however, have this op-
tion. Nationally-chartered hanks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve
System. Id. §§ 222, 282, 501a; Redford, supra note 226, at 768-69.
228 12 U.S.C.	 1815(a) (Stipp. II 1978). Only nonmember banks, however.
have this option. Member banks must have federal deposit insurance, Ir1. §§ 222, 1814,
1818(a) (1976 & Stipp. II 1978): Redford. supra note 226, at 768-69.
22!, The Comptroller of the Currency exerts day-to-day control over national
banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 161(a), 481 (1976). Nevertheless, national banks are required
to be members of the Federal Reserve System. id. §§ 222. 282, 501a, and the Board is
given authority under the Federal Reserve Act to regulate all member banks, id. §§
221, 284(a), 338. In addition, member banks must carry federal deposit insurance. Id.
§§ 222. 1814, 1818(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). To use their resources efficiently, the
three banking agencies coordinate their supervisory activities. Thus, the Office of the
Comptroller shares many of its examination reports with the Board, id. § 1844(c) (bank
holding company applications), and ihe FDIC has similar access to the examination
reports of the other agencies. on a reciprocal basis, id. § I817(a)(2).
23" National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (repealed 1864). Though
the National Batik Act of 1863 was repealed by the National Bank Act of 1864, ch.
106, 62, 13 Stat.. 99, 118, the latter Act continued the national-hank system, National
Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Slat. 99 (current version codified in scattered sections of
12, 19, 31 U.S.C.).
2 " 1 Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (current version codified in scattered sections of
12, 31 U.S.C.).
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eral Deposit Insurance Corporation was created," 2 vesting federal bank reg-
ulatory authority in three different agencies, with su pervisory power over na-
tional banks, Federal Reserve System member banks, and federally-insured
banks. 23" In 1960. however, Congress directly expressed its intention that the
various supervisory agencies share their overlapping regulatory powers, with
the enactment of the Bank Merger Act. 234 The Act specifies that the primary
agency involved in a proposed merger must seek the comments of the other
two agencies.!"' The present structure, therefore, undercuts First Lin-
colnwood's arguments that Congress did not envision an overlapping regula-
tory system.
In addition, although the nature of our federal banking system provides
that the Comptroller supervises national banks and the state banking depart-
ments supervise state banks,n" this national-state dichotomy is not always pre-
served. State-chartered banks have the options of (1) belonging to the Federal
Reserve System 237 and (2) carrying federal deposit insurance.2 "H Those state
banks that do exercise these options automatically subject themselves to
supervision by either the Federal Reserve Board or the FDIC. Since they re-
tain their state charters, however, such banks also remain under the supervi-
sory authority of their state banking departments. Thus, due to the intricate
system of banking and bank regulation in the United States, federal bank
regulators must work with each other and with their state counterparts in
enforcing the various banking laws. Hence, it is clear that Congress did not
intend the various banking agencies' areas of jurisdiction to be mutually ex-
clusive and non-overlapping, and that the Board's action in First Lincolnwood
did not involve it in areas which Congress had delegated exclusively to the
Comptroller.
The wisdom of this legislative choice to provide overlapping jurisdiction
is apparent in First Lincolnwood where the Comptroller recommended ap-
proval of the modified proposal despite its negative aspect of a decreased
addition to bank equity capita1. 23" The Federal Reserve Board disagreed and
opted in favor of a choice that tilted toward recognizing the primary goal of
protecting depositors. This second, protective layer of regulation makes it
more likely that banks and holding companies will be forced to maintain their
capital structures at levels which provide maximum investor protection. Such
a result is desirable and accords with congressional intent. The concern of
Congress for a stable banking system therefore underscores the correctness of
the Court's conclusion that a banking agency may deny applications solely on
232 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168-80 (current version
codified at 12 U.S.C: §§ 1811-1832 (1976	 Supp. II 1978)).
233 See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)-(h) (1976 & Stipp. II 1978).
234
 Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat.. 129 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
2" 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) (1976).
238 Wille, State Banking: A Study in Dual Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon.
733, 744-45 (1966).
2f7 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976).
238 Id. § 1815(a) (Supp. II 1978).
239 439 U.S. at 240.
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grounds of financial and managerial unsoundness even when that, unsound-
ness was not caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction, and that the
Board is the proper agency to perform this task.
IV. DISPUTE OVER THE BREADTH OF THE
HOLDiNG OF FIRST LINCOLNWOOD
Though it. would seem that the Court's decision was correct., the dissent
questioned the breadth of the holding. 21' The Court held that the Federal
Reserve Board may disapprove holding company applications solely on
grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness, even when that unsoundness
is not caused or exacerbated by the proposed transaction. 24 ' In dissenting
from that opinion, the minority urged that. the "in every case" provision man-
dates consideration of financial and managerial unsoundness only insofar as
such unsoundness is a consequence of the proposed transaction. 242
The majority replied to this portion of the dissent by adding footnote 18
to the Court's holding. 243 In that footnote, justice Marshall noted first that
the Court disagreed with the basic premise of the dissent's argument, but that,
even if the Court accepted the dissent's premise, it would be possible to say
that the proposed transaction did have a negative financial effect that was not
pre-existing—the creation of an unsound bank holding company. 244 De-
fending the Court's holding, Justice Marshall concluded that "the Board's at-
tempt to prevent this effect and to induce respondent to form an enterprise
that met the Board's standards of financial soundness was entirely consistent
with the language the dissent cites." 245 The majority attempted thereby to
recharacterize the effect of the transaction to meet the objections of the
dissenters.
Responding to the majority's re-characterization, Justice Stevens, author
of the dissent, added footnote 6 at the end of the dissenting opinion. 2" In it,
he remarked that
[w]hat purports to be a broad holding ... is significantly qualified by
n. 18 In that footnote the Court limits its holding to a case in
which the effect of the transaction is the formation of a financially
unsound bank holding company. So limited, this case involves no-
thing more than a dispute over whether this particular holding com-
pany was financially unsound—a dispute that hardly merits this
Court's attention. 247
Justice Stevens thus read the majority decision as saying that the Board must
approve any transaction where the bank holding company is not made un-
"" Id. at 252.
241 Id .
242 Id. at 254-55.
243 Id. at 252 n.18.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 258 n.6.
247 Id.
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sound after it acquires the unsound bank. Presumably this would be the case
where the holding company has other assets substantial enough to allow it to
remain stable, even after acquiring an unstable bank.
The dissent's interpretation of footnote 18 and its contention that it sig-
nificantly limits the majority holding are untenable for a number of reasons.
First, justice Marshall began by stating that he disagreed with the dissent's
basic premise—that the financial unsoundness must. result from the proposed
transaction."' He then attempted to show that, even if the Court had not.
rejected the dissent's position, its decision would still be the same. 249
 To try
to limit the Court's holding, as the dissent did, 259 would be to conclude that.
the majority accepted the dissent's premise, which it did not.
Second, the significance attached to footnote 18 by the dissent is
minimized by an earlier footnote of the majority opinion, footnote 15. 2 `''
There. justice Marshall referred to the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the
Board's contention that the transaction would weaken the Bank's capital posi-
tion. 252 The court of appeals seized on "the Board's concession during oral
argument before the original panel that operation of the hank through a
holding company 'might in fact be financially sounder' as a result of the tax
advantage ....' .253 justice Marshall, however, observed that, since the Court
held that. the Board _had the authority to disapprove First Lincolnwood's ap-
plication regardless of the transaction's effect on the Bank's capital position,
the Court did not have to express an opinion on this issue.' Hence, not
only is Justice Marshall saying that the proposed transaction need not create
or exacerbate any financial unsoundness; he is also implying that the Board
could reject the proposal even if it would improve the bank's capital structure,
if it would not improve it enough to meet the Board's standards.
Third, the dissent's contention regarding the impact of footnote 18 is
undercut by another part of the majority opinion in which the Court indicates
that it. perceives no "present-effect" limitation on the Board's power. 255 The
Court stated that the in every case" paragraph of section 3(c) even covers
cases in which the proposed transaction would not weaken the bank or the
holding company.25" Therefore, the majority states its holding in terms so
broad that they cannot support the dissent's interpretation of footnote 18.
Fourth, the dissent's argument lacks merit because it fails to recognize
the signficance of the fact that First Lincolnwood involves a one-bank holding
company. When a one-bank holding company "acquires" a bank, the transac-
tion is in substance a "paper transaction"; there is little, if any, change in
management. 257
 If such a holding company's operations are confined to
24H Id. at 252 n..18.
245 Id.
259
 Id. at 258 n.0..
25 ' Id. at 249 11.15.
252 Id,
253 Id,
254 Id
255 Id. at 249-50.
251; id.
257 Brief for the Petitioner at 22-23.
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banking, the holding company probably serves as a "corporate shell," an or-
ganization formed for the purpose of realizing tax savings. If the holding
company has no other assets besides the bank, as in First Lincolnwood, the
holding company will become unsound when it acquires the unsound bank. It
is possible, however, for the holding company to own only one hank but to
have other non-banking assets; a sound holding company may thus own an
unsound bank. Such holding companies, however, usually arc acquiring the
bank for diversification purposes. They probably would not be interested in
acquiring a "problem" bank, one in need of financial or managerial improve-
ment. It is improbable then that a one-bank holding company with substantial
assets would want to acquire an unsound hank, and it is impossible to have a
sound holding company and an unsound hank when the holding company
has no other assets besides the hank. _Justice Stevens suggests that the majori-
ty's holding does not extend to the case of a sound one-bank holding com-
pany owning an unsound bank. Even if this extension were true, such a situa-
tion is unlikely.
Fifth, in the area of multi-bank holding companies, Justice Stevens'
contention—that footnote 18 limits the Court's holding—is equally without.
merit. Such a limitation would mandate automatic Board approval of applica-
tions from bank holding companies which own other banks whose assets
would enable the. holding company to remain stable after acquiring an unsta-
ble batik. In such a case, however, the owners of the holding company prob-
ably would be different from the owners of the bank to be acquired, and the
Board would be faced with the usual issue of anticompetitive effect. The issue
of anticompetitive effect would arise because a multi-bank holding company
acquisition increases the strength and market share of that company, reduces
the number of independent banking organizations in the relevant banking
market., and, due to the newly-acquired bank's increased lending power, may
pose a threat to the bank's smaller competitors. Thus, the Board's decision
usually would not rest solely on the issue of financial and managerial re-
sources,''" and the transactional issue presented in First 1....j11C01117000(1 would not
arise.
Finally, the dissent's assertion runs counter to the thrust of the Court's
holding which recognizes the broad discretionary powers granted to the
Board by Congress.'" These powers were construed to allow the Board to
deny bank holding company applications on any one of several grounds, in-
cluding anticompetitive effect, financial unsoundness, managerial unsound-
ness, and poor future prospects.'" The Bank Holding Company Act does
not specify that all these grounds must be present, nor that any combination
must exist, before an application can be denied approval,'"' and the Court.
certainly did not read it that way. Accordingly. the Court. probably would not
reverse a Board denial even if it were shown that the holding company acqui-
25"
 In such a case, huwever, the stable holding company would he a source of'
strength to the unstable bank and the Biiard probably would approve the transaction
anyway. See text at note 49 supra.
25" 439 U.S. at 250,
2 '''' Id. at 250-52.
12	 § 1842(c) (1976).
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sitiott would improve the bank's financial condition. Clearly then, footnote 18
merely seeks - to rebut the rationale of the dissenting opinion but does not
limit the Court's holding.
CONCLUSION
First Lincolnwood involved a seemingly routine application by a newly-
organized bank holding company to acquire an already-existing bank in order
to realize substantial tax savings by utilizing certain tax provisions. In review-
ing the Federal Reserve Board's denial of the application, however, the Su-
preme Court was confronted with the problem of interpreting section 3(c) 'of
the Bank Holding Company Act. Faced with the questions whether the Board
can disapprove a holding company application solely on the grounds of finan-
cial or managerial unsoundness, and whether such a denial is limited to situa-
tions where the unsoundness is either caused or enhanced by the proposed
transaction, the Court construed the statute broadly to protect the discretion-
ary powers granted by Congress to bank regulatory agencies. Supported by
the legislative history, judicial precedent, and principles of statutory construc-
tion, the Court affirmed the Board's order and held that the Board can deny
holding company applications solely on grounds of financial or managerial
unsoundness, even when there would be no anticompetitive effect and the
unsoundness would be neither created nor exacerbated by the proposed
transaction.'" 2
 'fns decision is desirably consistent with the overall purpose
of federal banking legislation, the prevention of bank failures and the protec-
tion of individual depositors and the national economy.
OHN 0. (HANG
2 " 2 On March 31, 1980, Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub, No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132. Section 713
of the new law amended section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act by adding a
provision regarding one-bank holding company formations that involve bank stock
loans. Id. § 713, 94 Stat. ai 190, Although the amendment did not alter the other
provisions of section 3(c), it does state that the amendment itself should "not be con-
strued to prohibit the Board from rejecting any application solely because the other
Ilnancial arrangements are considered unsatisfactory." Id. Also, the new provision's
concluding sentence directs the Board to disapprove ally transaction "involving bank
stock loans for the formation of a one-bank holding company having a maturity of
twelve years or more if the Board believes the safety or soundness of the bank may
be jehpardized. - Id. This language indicates that Congress approves of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act in First Lincolnwood.
